The history of Iran over the past two centuries is a narrative of shifting and eroding borders. From the Treaties of Gulistan and Turkmenchay – which severed vast regions of the Caucasus and the northwest from the Iranian homeland – to the separation of Bahrain in 1971, Iran’s geographical map was subjected to continuous threats of diminution and fragmentation.
Yet, at a pivotal juncture in the history of this land, this trend was halted. Over the past four decades, while the Middle East has witnessed the fragmentation of countries and military occupations, Iran – despite enduring a devastating Eight-Year War and unprecedented geopolitical pressures – has not ceded a single inch of its territory to foreign powers. This paradigm shift is no accident; rather, it is the direct outcome of a fundamental transformation in the nature of Iranian “leadership.”
Leadership: The decisive variable
Political independence and territorial integrity are the two foundational pillars of any political system. The central argument of this piece is that the difference in Iran’s pre- and post-Islamic Revolution behavior regarding its borders is rooted in the nature of its leadership and its underlying decision-making logic.
In the pre-Revolutionary era, “territory” was treated merely as a bargaining chip in foreign relations and a means to secure the interests of major powers. In stark contrast, the leaders of the Islamic Revolution, relying on domestic capabilities and popular forces, transformed “territorial integrity” into a non-negotiable principle and an absolute red line. In this context, the role of “leadership” as the most critical determinant in either preserving or ceding territory is fundamentally different in both thought and practice between these two distinct eras.
Dual approaches across two eras: Pre- and post-Revolutionary Iran
- The pre-Revolutionary era: Territory as a bargaining chip and leadership failure
The historical record of the Qajar and Pahlavi monarchs demonstrates that deficiencies in the leadership apparatus, an inability to discern the objectives of foreign governments, and a reliance on external powers directly resulted in the cession of Iranian territory. During the reign of Fath-Ali Shah, two wars broke out with Tsarist Russia. The First Russo-Iranian War (1804–1813) ended in defeat and the signing of the Treaty of Gulistan (1813), which resulted in the secession of Georgia, Dagestan, Baku, and parts of Armenia and Azerbaijan from Iran. Historical analyses indicate that the “mismanagement of the war by Iran’s political leadership” and its inability to discern the objectives of foreign powers were the primary causes of this defeat, rather than any genuine Russian military superiority, as the weaponry of both sides was relatively equal in both quantity and quality (Pirnia, 1991; Rahimi, 2013).
Similarly, during the Second Russo-Iranian War (1826–1828), despite some major initial victories for Iran, the war ultimately ended in defeat and the imposition of the Treaty of Turkmenchay (1828). At this critical juncture, the Qajar monarch prematurely considered the victories conclusive, dismissed his forces, and returned to the capital without securing a definitive agreement with the adversary. This is regarded as the “greatest strategic error of the Iranian monarchs during this period” (Rahimi, 2013). In this war, the Iranian army did not differ significantly from the Russian forces in terms of quantity or quality. However, the Qajar king’s mismanagement in comprehending the enemy’s policies, coupled with his failure to deploy popular volunteer forces, paved the way for defeat and devastating losses for Iran.
During the five decades of rule under the Pahlavi father and son, seven strategic territories of Iran were ceded to foreign powers without any military conflict. The chief vulnerability of the Pahlavi regime was the pervasive influence and dominance of foreign entities. In 1971, the Imperial Government of Iran ceded Bahrain – which up to that point was considered Iran’s fourteenth province – following intense pressure from Great Britain. In an interview with The Guardian on August 27, 1966, the Shah had stated: “Since Bahrain’s oil is running out and its pearl industry has dried up, Bahrain is of no importance to us” (Tolu, 2007, Vol. 2, p. 1419).
Furthermore, under the 1931 border agreement with Turkey, nearly 800 square kilometers of Iranian territory were detached (Mokhber, 1945). Later, under the 1937 agreement, Iran’s sovereign rights over the Arvand Rud (Shatt al-Arab) waterway were nullified, and the entire river was effectively ceded to Iraq. Baqer Kazemi, the Foreign Minister of the time, recorded in his memoirs that Nuri al-Said, Iraq’s Foreign Minister, approached the Shah in tears, pleading: “Your Majesty, Iran is a vast and affluent country, while we are a destitute nation; please grant us a small portion of Iranian territory.” Swayed by these words, Reza Shah said: “Grant Iran a section in front of Abadan, and let the rest of the Shatt al-Arab remain as it currently stands” (Kazemi, 2012, Vol. 3, pp. 466–467).
B) The post-Islamic Revolution period: Territory as a national right and assertive leadership
Following the victory of the Islamic Revolution, the underlying logic of political decision-making underwent a fundamental transformation. Within Islamic political thought, the territory of Muslims is regarded as a sacred sanctuary, the defense of which constitutes an imperative duty for the Islamic community. Accordingly, Imam Khomeini (ra) regarded national territory as a divine, non-negotiable value, emphasizing that “Safeguarding the frontiers of Islam is among the religious obligations for which there is no higher duty” (Imam Khomeini, 1997, p. 119).
In his message to Leonid Brezhnev, he explicitly underscored “respect for the sovereignty of nations, the territorial integrity of countries, and non-interference in the affairs of others” (Imam Khomeini, 2006, Vol. 12, p. 342).
Following the Revolution’s victory, the largest military aggression against Iran was launched. On September 22, 1980, Iraq invaded Iran with the tacit approval and support of European countries and the United States. Under these conditions, Imam Khomeini’s leadership coupled with the steadfast resistance of the Iranian people, ultimately ensured the preservation of the country’s territorial integrity. Proclaiming that “Defense remains an ongoing imperative,” Imam Khomeini (ra) successfully mobilized the Iranian nation. He elevated the spirit of resistance across both the military and the public through his emphasis on “unity of purpose” and “the unification of forces” (Dehghani Firoozabadi, 2006).
This foreign policy – anchored in the principle of “Neither East, nor West” and reliance on domestic capabilities, coupled with a formidable deterrent posture – prevented any overt military annexation or the cession of Iranian land.
In 1979, amidst the surge of separatist movements along the country’s borders, Imam Khomeini (ra) declared: “We want to stand against foreigners; we want to preserve our nation, to keep it independent, and to ensure it is not partitioned… To whose benefit is this disintegration? Is it to the benefit of the nation, or does it serve others?” (Imam Khomeini, 2006, Vol. 8, p. 145).
Similarly, the martyred Leader of the Revolution, adhering to the paradigm established by Imam Khomeini (ra), has consistently emphasized the preservation of national unity and the country’s territorial integrity. Addressing the members of the Assembly of Experts in 2017, he noted: “Safeguarding the country’s independence, its territorial integrity, our national honor, and our national identity – these constitute our core principles” (Sayyid Ali Khamenei, September 21, 2017).
Furthermore, during a meeting with IRGC commanders in 2020, he reaffirmed: “Our defensive power is aimed not at aggression, but at defending the country, the nation, and the Revolution, as well as for securing the territorial integrity and independence of our country” (Sayyid Ali Khamenei, October 14, 2020).
The practical strategies employed by the martyred Imam Khamenei to ensure national independence and safeguard territorial integrity include: “enhancing defensive and deterrent capabilities” [through the development of missile capabilities and the strengthening of the Armed Forces], “managing crises and geopolitical threats” [such as ending the war, navigating the collapse of the Soviet Union, and preventing entry into regional conflicts], and “deepening regional strategic depth” [through advisory roles in Iraq and Syria to contain the threat of ISIS before it could reach Iran’s borders] (Sayyid Ali Khamenei, October 21, 2014).
His emphasis on strengthening the country’s defensive capabilities and domestic cohesion prevented the country from being drawn into regional wars. Furthermore, his guidance in maintaining the unity of military and security forces, strengthening both the IRGC and the Army, and establishing missile deterrence, created a strategic environment wherein no foreign or proxy power could infringe upon Iran’s borders (Sayyid Ali Khamenei, October 14, 2020).
The ultimate result of this powerful leadership has been the complete preservation of Iran’s geographical and political borders throughout more than three decades following the Eight-Year War.
Conclusion
Today, the map of Iran is not a single inch smaller than it was in 1978. This achievement was realized under the auspices of the leaders of the Islamic Revolution, who view the nation’s territory not as a bargaining chip for regime survival, but as an inalienable right of the people, grounding its preservation in indigenous capabilities and popular resistance.
In contrast, by relying on foreign powers and misjudging national interests, the pre-Revolutionary monarchs, relinquished vast swathes of Iranian land. This comparison demonstrates that preserving territorial integrity depends far less on covert diplomacy or international treaties than it does on “an independent will and strong leadership.”
As the Leader of the Islamic Revolution has stated: “Those bygone days (the domination of colonialists over Iran…) will never be repeated” (Sayyid Mojtaba Khamenei, September 28, 2026).
References
- Dehghani Firoozabadi, S. J. (2006). The Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Tehran: SAMT Publications.
- Kazemi, B. (2012). Memoirs from the Life of Baqer Kazemi (Vol. 3). Tehran: Tarikh-e Iran Publishing.
- Khomeini, R. (2006). Sahifeh-ye Imam: Collected Speeches, Messages, and Letters of Imam Khomeini (4th ed., Vols. 1–22). Tehran: The Institute for Publication and Compilation of Imam Khomeini’s Works.
- Mokhber, M. A. (1945). The Borders of Iran. Tehran: Keyhan Publishing.
- Pirnia, H. (1991). History of Iran from the Beginning to the Extinction of the Qajar Dynasty. Tehran: Donyaye Ketab.
- Rahimi (Roshan), H. (2013). The Role of the Leadership of the Islamic Revolution in Safeguarding Iran’s Territorial Integrity: A Comparative Perspective on Contemporary History. Journal of Islamic Revolution Studies, 10(32), 11–34.
- Tabatabai, J. (2001). Iran: History, Politics, Culture (pp. 255–260). Tehran: Negah-e Moaser Publishing.
- Tolou, H. (2007). The History of the Disintegration of Iran Tehran: Samarqand Publishing.

