The war of narratives is one of the arenas of global struggle

How does your narrative regarding the seizure of the US Spy Den [US Embassy] differ from domestic and foreign accounts of this event?

In studies examining Iran-US relations, and particularly the seizure of the US Embassy in November 1979, various narratives emerge. However, on a broader level, two overarching narratives can be identified:

1. The American narrative

2. The Iranian narrative

The terms “American narrative” and “Iranian narrative” do not necessarily imply that the authors, researchers, or narrators are American or Iranian, nor do they strictly denote the exclusive use of American or Iranian sources and documents. Rather, they signify that the narrative’s perspective aligns either with the viewpoint of the United States government or with that of Iranian society. The American narrative examines the bilateral relationship and the events of November 1979 through the “lens of the US government” and its interests in Iran. As we know, US governmental interests in Iran have, from the time of the embassy seizure to the present day, been either entirely dismantled or, at the very least, severely diminished. Conversely, the Iranian narrative, which reflects the “perspective of Iranian society,” views the seizure of the US Embassy as a guarantor of Iran’s post-revolutionary independence and the preservation of its national interests.

Throughout contemporary history, Iranian society has consistently observed that the nation’s own interests were assigned a lower priority than those of foreign powers. Prior to World War II, British and Russian interests in Iran invariably superseded Iran’s national interests, yielding outcomes such as concessions and monopolies in sectors like oil, road construction, telegraph lines, and fisheries. The most profound consequence of this precedence of foreign interests over Iran’s national sovereignty was the occupation of the country during both World Wars. Despite Iran’s declaration of neutrality in both conflicts, Russian and British forces occupied Iranian territory to secure their own wartime interests.

Following the Second World War and the subsequent decline of European powers, the United States gradually expanded its influence in Iran. As in the past, American interests in the country continued to take precedence over the national interests of the Iranian people. The most prominent example of this was the 1953 coup d’état, orchestrated against a nationalist movement led by Dr. Mohammad Mosaddegh. The nationalization of the oil industry in the 1950s represented the ultimate manifestation of Iran securing its national interests; however, the interests of the United States and Britain dictated that the Iranian people not be permitted to exercise this right. This is a matter that is frequently overlooked in numerous scholarly works. However, if one takes into account this collective Iranian memory regarding the blows dealt by great powers to their national interests, a profoundly different narrative of the seizure of the US Embassy emerges.

Why did Iranians refer to the US Embassy as the “US Spy Den”?

The term “Spy Den” in the popular discourse of the Iranian people is a product of the very same collective memory shaped by the 1953 American coup against Iran’s national movement. At the time, Iranian society viewed the US Embassy as the headquarters of the coup against Dr. Mosaddegh’s democratically elected government, and believed it was plotting to orchestrate a similar coup against the Islamic Revolution and its ensuing political system. Interestingly, the usage of the term “Spy Den” predates the actual seizure of the US Embassy. During the period when the Shah had been entered the United States and the Iranian people were demonstrating in front of the US Embassy, one of the prominent chants was: “The US Embassy, this den of spies, must be shut down!”

This slogan, and others like it, perfectly encapsulated the societal perception and collective memory of the Iranian people – a perception that was, in fact, further solidified following the discovery of the documents within the US Embassy.

After the Revolution, were we the ones who initiated hostility or was it the US? Did our problems with the United States begin with the seizure of their embassy?

One of the key distinctions between the Iranian and American narratives lies precisely in the issue you just raised: namely, who initiated the hostility between Iran and the United States and triggered the breakdown in bilateral relations. As I mentioned earlier, the dominant narrative found in American accounts posits that Iran provoked American outrage by occupying the US Embassy in Tehran and holding American diplomats hostage for 444 days. According to this view, the severing of diplomatic relations during this incident meant that US-Iranian issues were never resolved, a stalemate that persists to this day.

The Iranian perspective, however, views the US Embassy seizure as a reactive and preemptive measure designed to thwart American interference in Iran’s internal affairs and their operations against the Iranian Revolution. Iranians were deeply concerned about a recurrence of the 1953 coup following the nationalization of the country’s oil industry. Coincidentally, documents later uncovered within the US Embassy served to validate these very fears.

Of course, a significant portion of these American interventions was not covert. For instance, Iranians viewed the anti-Iranian resolution passed by the US Senate in May 1979 – spearheaded by Senator Jacob Javits – as direct interference in their country’s internal affairs. This resolution was so contentious that even the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran’s Provisional Government lodged a formal complaint against it. Similarly, granting asylum to the Shah and allowing him to enter US territory was interpreted as nothing short of outright hostility toward the Islamic Republic of Iran.

It is striking that the US government granted asylum to the Shah of Iran, who had fled the country and whom Iranians were seeking to extradite and put on trial, while conversely, it abducted Nicolás Maduro, the legitimate President of Venezuela, during his term in office! Furthermore, the presence of US naval vessels near Iranian coastal waters only compounded this sense of imminent threat.

These were the clear signs that Iranians observed prior to the seizure of the US Embassy, which understandably generated a sense of threat from the American side. However, there were also covert operations of which Iranians were entirely unaware, only discovering them after the unearthing of the US Embassy documents, particularly those pertaining to the CIA station. These documents later served as concrete proof that the seizure of the US Embassy thwarted the execution of CIA operatives’ plans in Iran. For instance, one such covert CIA operation in Iran involved the creation of a coalition of “moderate” factions. The CIA attempted to rally groups amenable to advancing US interests in Iran around Ayatollah Shariatmadari, aiming to sideline the “radicals” – namely, Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers – to seize power. This political coalition would never have materialized without the active involvement and investment of the CIA station.

Another example of such interference was the manipulation of the Provisional Government’s decisions, facilitated through Abbas Amir-Entezam, a CIA asset within that government. Various schemes were pursued through this channel, the most significant being the reopening of the TACKSMAN electronic intelligence-gathering bases in northeastern Iran to monitor the Soviet Union. Another notable example was the mass recruitment of CIA assets within the Iranian military, a process that began in February 1979 and continued unabated until the seizure of the US Embassy in November of that year. These military personnel were not necessarily individuals with access to classified intelligence; rather, they included operational assets, such as a Cobra helicopter battalion commander and even an F-14 fighter pilot. In one significant document, Tom Ahern, the CIA Station Chief in Tehran, reported to CIA Director Stansfield Turner that the Iranian military had not yet regained its discipline, and that no actionable steps could be taken until order was restored within the ranks.

These examples, among others, clearly demonstrate that even setting aside the 1953 coup, the United States had already initiated its hostile actions prior to the seizure of its embassy in Iran, and that what occurred on November 1979 was a direct reaction to these measures and interferences.

Why did the negotiations and agreements take so long? Were we really to blame for the failure to reach agreements on the release of the hostages, just as we are these days accused of undermining negotiations?

The prolongation of the negotiations to release the hostage stemmed from various factors, which I have detailed extensively in my book. To sum it up, one of the primary reasons for this delay was that the country’s formal state institutions had not yet been fully established following the Revolution. Specifically, I am referring to the formation of the Parliament, which, according to the directive of Imam Khomeini (ra), was tasked with approving the terms and conditions for the hostages’ release as its first order of business. However, the process of convening and inaugurating the Parliament took considerable time.

Another factor that prolonged the negotiations and led to incomplete agreements that could not be implemented was the use of the negotiations by certain political figures to advance their own factional interests. As I have explained in the book, some political figures sought to play a role in the process in ways that would allow them to use the negotiations to serve their personal and factional interests. In other words, Iran’s negotiations with the United States in 1980 became one of the means through which individuals sought to advance their personal and factional interests within Iran’s political climate. Some politicians viewed the resolution of the issue as a way to consolidate their own political power in Iran. The secret negotiations between Sadegh Ghotbzadeh and Hamilton Jordan serve as a prime example of this.

Of course, a similar dynamic also existed on the American side. For many American politicians, resolving the Iran issue could provide them with an advantage in electoral contests. Conversely, the opposing party’s failure to resolve the issue could be used as a political weapon against it.

Has your narrative gained any traction within Western and American academic circles? Or do they continue to emphasize one-sided accounts? Have reputable publishers or global media outlets paid any attention to your narrative? If not, why?

Unfortunately, the Iranian narrative regarding the seizure of the US Embassy has failed to gain significant traction within Western academic circles. This is due to a variety of factors, some of which stem from the Western side, and others from the Iranian side.

The factors attributable to the West are rooted in its structural power and media dominance, which possess the capacity to shape our very understanding of knowledge. This topic is thoroughly elucidated in Edward Said’s book, Covering Islam, which details how Western media and academic institutions portrayed the seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran and shaped our understanding of Iran–US relations.

However, this is not the entire story. Another set of contributing factors, which I believe is by no means insignificant, lies with the Iranians themselves. One highly effective American tradition that has coincidentally done much to cement their narrative is the meticulous recording and publication of diaries and memoirs. In the specific case of the seizure of the US Embassy, nearly all the key players in the US administration – including Jimmy Carter, Cyrus Vance, Stansfield Turner, Harold Brown, Hamilton Jordan, and others – have published their daily journals or, at the very least, their memoirs, which serve as primary sources for researchers. Many of the former hostages have similarly authored and published their own memoirs. Furthermore, official documents from institutions such as the US Department of State and the Department of Defense are largely accessible to researchers.

By contrast, however, we have very few memoirs and diaries from the Iranian actors involved, which makes it extremely difficult to reconstruct the Iranian perspective. More importantly, the few sources that do exist are predominantly in Persian, rendering them inaccessible to Western researchers who do not possess proficiency in the language.

There are, of course, a handful of books published in English. One example is the memoir of Masoumeh Ebtekar, one of the Muslim students who followed Imam Khomeini’s ideology. Her memoir was published in English under the title Takeover in Tehran: The Inside Story of the 1979 U.S. Embassy Capture. However, such scarce examples are wholly insufficient to meet the research needs of international researchers.

Why did the martyred Imam [Khamenei] pay special attention to your book?

I believe the clearest answer to your question can be found in the text of his written endorsement. He viewed the realm of research as one of the primary arenas of media warfare and the war of narratives, and firmly believed that it was imperative to work intensively in this field. This is precisely the point I raised earlier, drawing on Edward Said’s book, Covering Islam. Said argued that great powers utilize academic research and media propaganda to produce knowledge and shape understanding within societies. Our martyred Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, also believed that the “war of narratives” is one of the arenas of “global struggles,” a battlefield where truths are deliberately distorted and turned upside down. Yet, we continue to face significant media gaps that must be bridged. In my view, the martyred Imam’s special attention to this issue underscores our profound need for more extensive and rigorous research across various disciplines of the humanities, recognizing that such scholarly work possesses the true capacity to generate power.