Iran won’t accept unrestricted inspections under threat: Envoy

Date:

Iran’s Ambassador and Permanent Representative to International Organizations in Vienna stresses that Tehran will not submit to unrestricted inspections under continued military threats, stating that any request from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be decided based on security considerations.

The full text of Reza Najafi’s speech at the Board of Governors of the IAEA on the Nuclear Program of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Vienna, 18 November 2026) is as follows:

I associate myself with the joint statement of China, Iran and Russia.

Reiterating Iran’s consistent and strong objection to derestricting the DG’s report, I inform you that our position on the report is reflected in INFCIRC/1442.

Mr. Chairman,

I wish to begin with this part of the Director General’s report: “It is more than a year since the Agency lost continuity of knowledge.”

It is simply a partial, inconclusive fact on Iran’s peaceful nuclear program.

There are more important realities that this Board cannot ignore.

The first fact is that Iran has engaged seriously and extensively with the Agency over years in order to address possible concerns, and in 2015, with “the Final Assessment,” all past issues were closed by this very Board.

In the same year, the JCPOA, concluded after years of intensive negotiations among Iran, the P5+1 and the EU and endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 2231, stands as the clearest example of that record.

Iran’s cooperation has gone beyond its legally binding obligations, including the limitation on uranium enrichment for a long period and the voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol for extended periods, although Iran never ratified it.

16 consecutive Agency reports verified Iran’s full implementation of its JCPOA commitments.

On 5 March 2018, the then Director General of this Agency stated, and I quote: “The IAEA now has the world’s most robust verification regime in place in Iran.” “Our current verification capability is much stronger than it has ever been.”

He added, and again I quote: “We have had access to all the locations that we needed to visit. Our inspection work has doubled since 2013. IAEA inspectors now spend 3,000 calendar days per year on the ground in Iran. We have installed some 2,000 tamper-proof seals on nuclear material and equipment.”

These are not Iran’s claims; they are the explicit, word-for-word statements of the Director General of this very Agency, made on the record, and no one in this room can dismiss them as political.

By the Agency’s own figures, between 2013 and 2017 its verification activities in Iran rose by 152 percent.

Iran also accounted for about half of all images collected daily by the Agency’s global surveillance network.

Annual verification costs rose by 230 percent and inspector field days by 100 percent.

Such an unprecedented scope of verification was simply impossible without Iran’s complete cooperation.

The second fact is that this loss of continuity has a cause, namely the massive unlawful military attacks on our safeguarded nuclear facilities by the U.S. and the Israeli regime.

Those aggressions were launched less than 24 hours following the adoption of the US sponsored resolution of this Board in June 2025, and in the midst of negotiations and struck facilities whose material was entirely under safeguards, at a time when Agency inspectors had full presence and access throughout Iran.

The Secretariat itself has acknowledged that these attacks created an unprecedented situation, so no one can pretend that this cause is unknown, disputed or irrelevant to the Agency’s work.

The third fact is that the Secretariat’s report and this Board’s resolutions are silent on these unlawful attacks, which have extensive and serious material effects on both Iran’s right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the CSA’s implementation.

The sponsors may omit any reference to the attacks in their resolutions, but realities neither vanish nor are addressed through denial, silence, or the neglect of legal and institutional duties.

Ignoring a problem does not make it go away; it only makes it harder to resolve.

A related fact is that the Secretariat’s report and the Board’s legally flawed resolutions have never condemned the attacks, not even in the most formal terms.

Worse still, this very Board’s non-consensual resolution ignores both the attacks and their serious and far-reaching effects on present conditions, as though nothing had ever happened.

In 1981, when the Israeli regime attacked an Iraqi under-construction nuclear facility, the General Conference and the Board adopted nearly ten resolutions condemning it, including as an attack on the safeguards system.

This time the attacks were larger, more extensive, on operational facilities with nuclear materials and, by the Director General’s own admission, unprecedented in the Agency’s history, yet the response of the Agency in its entirety has been deadly silence.

How can certain members of the Board demand cooperation and transparency while remaining silent in the face of military attacks against facilities subject to the safeguards system, and what message does that send to every Member State?

Another astonishing fact is the attempt to place the effect in the position of the cause and then to assign responsibility for the loss of continuity to the victim rather than to the aggressors.

Neither the Secretariat nor certain members of the Board can attribute this loss to Iran, directly or indirectly, or present it, implicitly or explicitly, as the result of our practical limitation to cooperate.

The report wrongly calls the Agency’s lack of information and access a serious proliferation and compliance concern requiring utmost urgency. Yet it brushes aside the attacks that created this lack, an approach that is neither objective nor professional.

A further fact is that not every exercise of institutional power is lawful, and not every resolution acquires legitimacy because of its mere adoption.

The legality of resolutions depends on strict compliance with all substantive and procedural requirements governing their adoption. Failure to meet them undermines the very validity of the decisions concerned.

Institutional powers must be exercised for their legally prescribed purposes, and they cannot be used to impose adverse consequences on the victim of aggression for circumstances created by unlawful use of force.

Yet the three resolutions adopted after the aggression, in November 2025 and in June and September 2026, neither condemned it nor even made a single reference thereto as if their sponsors are deaf and blind and not heard and seen of such armed attacks.

Instead, they demanded access to all nuclear sites while the threat of further attacks persisted and while those very attacks seriously impede the normal implementation of safeguards.

The allies of aggressors may make such requests, but they cannot make them mechanically, in disregard of an extremely grave prevailing situation that does not allow such inspections to take place.

The Agency is legally and institutionally bound to seriously take this substantive reality into consideration in all its reports, decisions, and requests.

The September 2026 resolution was a clear case of abuse of power and process, and therefore both unlawful and illegitimate.

The same is true of earlier resolutions addressing matters that this Board itself had considered and formally closed in 2015, which cannot be reopened for political convenience.

The Agency is expected to act independently, impartially, without discrimination and strictly within the Statute.

Technical safeguards issues cannot and must not be turned into instruments of political pressure or geopolitical confrontation.

The Agency’s credibility depends on the consistent application of international law, which was called by the US as stupid rules, and equal treatment of all Member States, without double standards or selectivity, and on good faith.

Another fact is that the Agency said it remains open to considering Iran’s legitimate safety and security concerns, but this abstract promise and statement resolves nothing, simply because those concerns are not abstract.

These concerns are the practical consequences of the unlawful attacks and of continuing threats. The U.S. President declared openly: “We wiped out their nuclear possibilities. They can start again. If they do, we’ll wipe it out faster.” This is an open threat of force against Iran, including its nuclear installations.

These concerns also include the recent offer by the U.S. Government of a reward of millions of dollars, together with possible relocation, in exchange for information concerning Iran’s nuclear program, including its associated personnel, members of its scientific community, facilities and equipment.

What other intention could lie behind this action, aside from facilitating and planning for further illegal attacks, terrorist acts and sabotage?

Does their insistence on an immediate inspection of the attacked sites signify anything other than an attempt to gather intelligence for a renewed attack?

Had they genuinely valued safeguards, they would never have attacked facilities already under safeguards for years.

Under these conditions, the report’s encouragement that Iran consider technical and gradual measures is like blowing a horn from the wrong end, an exercise in futility.

Can anyone guarantee, definitively, that these aggressors will not strike again the moment inspections are completed and the information collected by the Agency?

Normal conditions for safeguards can only be restored through the complete, definitive and permanent end of the war and a firm guarantee against renewed aggression, which definitely lies beyond the Agency’s capacity.

A further fact is that the situation will never return to what it was before the attacks, and new circumstances will be taken into account in every instance of cooperation with the Agency.

We will definitively reconsider the quality of access and the conditions applicable in each individual case. This is one of the inevitable consequences of the attacks.

We will likewise definitely reconsider our policy regarding the admission of designated inspectors. We will surely not allow ourselves to be “strongly condemned” by the Director General for merely exercising our right under the CSA’s Article 9 regarding the designation of inspectors.

This approach reflects painful experience: our trust and 25 years of extensive and good faith cooperation were abused; and we were attacked during negotiations, even though all our material was under safeguards and inspectors had access everywhere.

This does not mean that Iran disregards its obligations; on the contrary, Iran is bound by them and will remain so, but they are not based on unconditional or unlimited cooperation.

This means we will not accept being bombed on the one hand while being asked in a tone of entitlement, on the other, to provide detailed information about our materials and sites and grant unrestricted access to them.

Which country in the world, having been attacked in the midst of diplomacy, would then hand over its most sensitive information, and why should Iran be expected to do so?

Another fact is that, contrary to the repeated insistence and assertions that implementation of the CSA can never be suspended under any circumstances, Iran is fully entitled, under international law, to suspend performance of its safeguards obligations under the current situation.

The legal dimensions of this issue were set out by my delegation at the previous Board meeting and in subsequent INFCIRC communications, which demonstrated that suspension is legally permissible, and that this right undeniably exists.

So I will not repeat those arguments today. I stress instead that, despite possessing this right, Iran has not exercised it yet, and should circumstances require, we will exercise it without hesitation.

What exists today is an inability to perform certain obligations, caused by a fundamental change of circumstances, a ground well recognized in international law.

Notwithstanding this right, Iran remains committed, has cooperated, and will continue to cooperate, but only to the extent that practical conditions permit and in a manner consistent with our legitimate security considerations.

Accordingly, each request will be examined and decided on a case-specific basis, which is both a requirement of the law adopted by our Parliament and an unavoidable demand of the present situation created by the aggressions.

Incidentally, contrary to the misreading reflected in the Secretariat’s report, that law does not suspend cooperation; it only regulates how our rights are exercised and our obligations are performed under exceptional conditions, consistent with our international commitments.

Yet another reality is that, before the aggressions, the Agency was fully aware of the fate of our nuclear material to the last gram, and today, if it lacks such knowledge, the aggressors must be blamed.

Before concluding, I stress that Iran unequivocally rejects the assertion that the already-terminated resolutions have been reinstated. Our relevant legal position is reflected in detail in our INFCIRC communications.

Iran is under no obligation whatsoever arising from previously terminated resolutions of the UN Security Council, or from the resolutions of this Board in reference to such terminated resolutions. Any request founded upon them has been, is, and will be rejected, irrespective of the prevailing safety and security conditions.

Finally, Iran will continue to honour its obligations and to resolutely pursue the exercise of its inalienable right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy in all its aspects, including its inherent right to develop a full national nuclear fuel cycle.

We urge the Agency and this very Board to act, in all instances, in full conformity with the Statute, to avoid acting ultra vires or abusing process and power, and to make all their assessments and decisions based on the principles of objectivity, independence, impartiality, and non-discrimination.

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